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TOPIC
I~Il\IUXITY

v.

OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA.

Should private property at sea be exempt £ron1
capture?
CONCLUSION.

The United States 1nay "\vith propriety abandon the
contention £or the general exmnption o£ enemy private property at sea and seek agree1nent upon a certain
list o£ exemptions -vvhich meet the approval o£ the states
of the "\vorld and which may £rom time to time be expanded as the sentiment fo r exemption becomes more
general.
·
NOTES.

Introduction.-A decision as to the treatment o£ priYate property at sea in time o£ war is in certain respects
fundamental. A code o£ rules for the conduct o£ maritime
warfare based on the right to capture private property
vvould be materially modified by the prohibition o£ this
rjght. The strategy o£ war "\Vould also probably be modified. The attempts to make private property immune
from capture have not yet met with success, therefore,
any rules drawn up may properly concede· the right o£
capture at sea o£ enemy private property. The considerations advanced in regard to the exemption o£ private property at sea should, however, receive attention.
United States proposition at The Hag~te, 1899.-Under
date of June 20, 1899, the American commission at the
First Hague Conference presented a ·communication to
the conference stating that they were instructed to place
before the conference the following proposition:
The privat~ property of all citizens or subjects of the signatory
powers, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt
from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the
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armed vessels or by the military forces of any of the said signatory poY\'ers. But nothing herein contained shall extend exemption from seizure to vess els and their cargoes which may attempt
to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of the said
powers. (Holls, Peace Conference at 'rhe I-Iague, p. 311.)

Thjs 'vas signed by the commission, consjsting o:f Andre'v D. vVhite, Seth Lo,v, Stanford Newel, A. T. Mahan~
'Villiam Crozier, Frederick ,V. Rolls.
The communication o:f the American commission
showed that the attitude o:f the United States had been
:favorable to the exemption o:f private property :from capture. The com1nittee o:f the conference did not :feel itself
competent to take up the subject, but reco1nmended that
it be included in the program o:f a :further conference.
In speaking on this subject Mr. 'Vhite said in behalf o:f
the }unerican com1nission:
The commission ha Ye found severa: of the delegn tions ready to
accept this proposal, and sundry others whose opinions evidently
incline toward its adoption, but we have not succeeded in sec1.'1ring
a support sufficiently unanimous to justify us in pressing the
matter further during the present conference. (Ibid., 314.)

Mr. White also 1nade quite an extended argtnnent :for
the exen1ption, and the proposition 'vas inserted in the
:forn1 of a 'vish in the Final Act o:f the First Hague Conference, as :follows:
5. The conference expresses the wish thu t the proposn 1. which
contemplates the declaration of the inviolability of private property in naval warfare, may be referred to a subsequent conference
for consideration~ (Ibid., p. 379.)

Capture or destruction of enemy JJJ ivate prope1 (r; at
sea.-Topic I considered at the Naval 'Var College Conference in 1905 proposed the question, "vVhat regulations
should be made in regard to private property at sea in
time o:f vvar? "
In the discussion o:f this topic the attitude o:f the
United States 'vas traced :fron1 the early days o:f the
Republic. It 'vas sho,vn that the attitude o:f the United
States had usually been in :favor o:f the exen1ption o:f private property at sea :fro1n capture.
FroIn the general conclusions as to the policy o:f capture
a :fevv citations 1nay be made.
1

CAP'l'UHE ~\~D DESTHUCTION OF EN E:\fY PHOPERTY.

11.5

There is a growiug opinion tlln t the ren sons for ca I>l ure of
tlle enemy's pl'i va te property at sea are economic awl political
rather thnn military. The immunity to lH'i vate property should
uot, ho,vever, be so extended as to interfere with necessary militnry operations. It would not be reasonable to exempt private
property to such an extent as to cause the war to be of necessity prolonged or to result in greater destruction of life. Imperatlve military necessity, of which the superior officer on the fie1d
of action at the time must judge, must m·erride rights of private
property. The question of damages n1ay be reserved for subsequent settlement. ( Interna tiona I La·w Topics and Discussions,
1905, p. 17.)

The equitaule practice of days of grace will probably be continued. The use of improved means of communication will be
extended. Privateering is abandoned. Prize money is beginning
to be abolished. Land commerce is more and more developed.
In time of 'var commerce is more easily transferred to neutral
flags. 'I'he actual influence of the capture of private property
does not seem to be great. The weakening of a naval force in
order to pursue and capture private property is of doubtful expediency. Such considerations as these show why the tendency
to guarantee the exemption of all private property at sea in
tJme of 'var by an international agreen1ent has been looked upon
with increasing favor.
The proposed exemption, if it extended to all goods and propE-rty, would probably make necessary an· extension of the list of
contraband. Contraband as now used applies only to certain
c-lasses of goods carried by or belonging to neutra1s. If enemy
property is placed on the same basis as neutral property, the
doctrine of contraband must be ~nterpretecl nccordingly and the
principles en uncia ted with this in view. (Ibid., p. 19.)

After lengthy discussion and considerable difference of
opinion, it ·was found necessary in the conference of 1905
to make so1ne special provision in regard to vessels. The
brief statement 'vas as follo,vs:
The vessels of the enemy used in commerce may be enemy private property. Certain of these Yessels may readily become of
great service to the enemy. Vessels of like character, if belonging to a neutral, could not be classed as contraband. Owing to
tbe ease with which many types of commercial vessels may be
converted to warlike uses, it seems proper that such agencies of
transportation should not be placed under the general exemption.
The degree of exemption to be extended to vessels may prop(•rly be left to. the belligerents to determine.
Considering the general conditions of modern naval warfare
nnd commercial relations, as well as the trend of opinion, to-
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getiler with the exceptional character of private vessels belonging
to enemy citizens, an attempt to formulate a proper regulation
in regard to the exemption of private property at sea may be
considered expedient. Of course such exemption does not cover
r;roperty of_contraband natur~, property involved in violation of
blockade, property involved in unneutra1 service or otherwise concerned directly in the war. Tile regulation of exemption should
apply, therefore, only to innocent property and ships.
Some such regulation in regard to vessels as the following
seems to n1eet the requirements imposed by the above discussion
~md conclusions :
Innocent private silips, except belligerent -resse1s propelled by
machinery and capable of keeping tile high seas, are not liable
to cnpture.
It nwy be said tiln t the word," innocent" npplies only to such
t,rivnte property or shivs ns lwve no direct relation to or share
i11 the Ilostilities. It may be nssumed that innocent belligerent
goods or ships may be taken in case of military necessity, and
when so tnken full remuneration sila1l be paid, nfter the nnalogy
of similnr action on land. (Ibid .. p. 20.)

' The proposed regulation in regard to the treatment of
private property at sea was:
Innocent neutral goods and ships are not liable to capture.
Innocent enemy goods and ships, except vessels propelled by
machinery and capable of keeping the high seas, nre not linble to
capture. (Ibid., p. 20.)

United States proposition at The Hague, 1907.-In accordance with the vote of the First Hague Conference as
expressed in the " wish " of the final a:ct of the Conference, the immunity of private property at sea was included in the program of the Second Hague Conference
in 1907. The subject was referred to the fourth committee, and the American proposition was in ~lmost the same
words as in 1899.
Mr. Choate, on June 28, 1907, made a long speech reviewing the attitude of the United States upon the question of inviolability o£ private property at sea. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III.,
pp. 750-764.) Mr.· Choate, representing the American
delegation, speaks of the immunity of private property
at sea, saying:
This proposition involves a principle which has been advocated
from the beginning by the Government of the United States and
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urged by it upon other nations and which is most 'varmly cherished by the American people, and the President is of opinion
that whatever may be the apparent specific interest of our ow11
or of any other country for the time being, the principle thus declared is of such permanent and universal importance that no
balancing of the chances of probable loss or gain in the immediate
future on the part of any nation should be permitted to ~utweigh
the considerations of common benefit to civilization which call
for the adoption of such an agreement. (Deuxieme Conference
Interna tionale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 766.)

Mr. Choate also speaks of this doctrine as " our favorite proposition," "the traditional policy of the United
States," and at the same time saying, " I ought most
frankly to concede that the United States has never been
able to put this policy· into practical operation." Mr.
Choate cites the opinion of statesmen and \vriters in favor
of exemption and argues that the reasons for exmnptio11
of private property on land apply to si1nilar property at
sea. He -urges the exemptionFirst, on humanitarian grounds; secondly, we place it on a
ground more important still, of the unjustifiable interference with
innocent and legitimate commerce, which concerns not alone the
nation to which the ship belongs, but the who~e cidlizecl world.
'Ve insist upon our proposition in the third place as a direct adYance toward the limitation of war to its proper province, a con·
test between the armed forces of the States by land. and sea
against each other and against the public property of the respective states. . engaged. And, finally, 've object to the old practice
and insist upon our demand for its abolition on the ground that
it is now no longer necessary, and that it tends to invite war
and to provoke new wars as a natural result of its continuance.
(Ibid., pp. 774-775.)

Mr. Choate supports his position by arguments, some
oi which have a bearing upon the military significance o£
this doctrine of exemption:
Apart from all historical and ethical points of Yiew, it may well
hP claimed that there is another strong ground in support of the
immunity of private property at sea, not needed for military purposes, for which we contend. From economical considerations
it is no longer worth the while of maritime nations to construct
and maintain ships of war for the purpose of pursuing merchant
ships which haye nothing to do with the contest. The marked
trend of naYal warfare among all great maritime nations at the
present time is to dispense with armed ships adapted to such
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service, antl to concentrate their entire resources upon the construction of great hatt1eships whose encot1nters with thosE of
their adversaries shall decide any. contest, thus conflcing wa1 a~
lt should be, to a test of strength between the armed i\n ~es and
tbe financial resources of the combatants on sea and land. It is
1:.robnb 1 e that. if the truth were known, there has been an actual
diminution by all the maritime nations in the construction of
\Yar vessels adapted to the pursuit of merchantmen. and, indeed.
fl sale or breaking up of such vessels which had been for some
time in service. Indeed. none of the great navies now existing
could afford to employ any of their great and costly ships of war
c>r cruisers in the paltry pursuit of merchantn1en scattered over
the seas. 1 Tl~e game "·ould not be worth the candle and the expense would be more than any probable result.
This 11resents in another form the idea a1ready referred to that
\'\;ar has come to be, as it should be, a contest between the nations
engaged and not between either nation and the noncombatant
citizens or individuals of the other nation, and it results from it
that the noncombatant citizens should be let alone, and that no
amount of pressure that can be brought to bear upon them will
l1a ve any serious effect in shortening the controversy. (Ibid.,
p. 777.)

Of the proposition that the " most effective ·way of preYenting \Yar is to 1nake it as terrible as possible," Mr.
Choate, after sho·wing that the trend of the Geneva and
other conventions is in the opposite direction, says:
Of course there is no truth or sanity in such a brutal suggestion. Our duty is not to make war as horrible as possible, but
to make it as harmless as possible to all who do not actually
take part in it, to prevent as far as we can, to bring it to an end
as speedily as we can, to n1itigate its evils as far as human
ingenuity can accomplish that result, and to limit the engines and
instruments of war to their legitimate use-the fighting of battles
nnd the blockading and protection of seacoasts. (Ibid., p. 778.)

Other arguments are also presented, and as these constitute -vvhat is regarded as an official statement of the
position of the United States, the paragraphs concluding
Mr. Choate's address 1nay be cited:
Again, it is urged that the retention of this ancient right of
capture and detention is necessary as the only Ineans of bringing
war to an end. That when you have destroyed the fleets of your
enemy and conquered its arn1ies it has no object in suing for
peace as long as its commerce and its conu11unica tion by transportation with other nations in the way of trnde is left undisturbed.
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But this seems to us to be n purely fanciful and imaginary
proposition. The history of modern wars, and, in fact, of all
w·ars, shows that the decisive victory over an enemy by the destruction of his fleets and the defeat of his armies is sure to bring
about peace. The test of strength to which the parties appealed
has thereby been decided and there is no further object in contnluing the war.
The picking up or destruction of a few harmless and helpless
merchantmen upon the sea, will ba ve no appreciable effect in
reducing the government and nation to which they belong to
subjection, if the defeat of fleets and armies bas not accomplished
that result. Besides, there is a limit to the legitimate right of
even the victor upon the seas for -the time being to employ his
power for purposes of destruction. Victory in naval battles is
one thing, but ownership of the high seas is another. In fact,
rightly considered, there is- no such tb~ng as ownership of the
seas. According to the universal judgment and agreement of
nations they have been and are always free seas-free for innocent and unoffending trade and commerce. And in the interest
of mankind in general they must always remain so.
Again, it bas been urged that the power to strike at the mercantile marine of other nations is a powerful factor in deterring them
frmn war-that the merchants having such great interests involved, Iiab~e to be sacrificed by the outbreak of war, will do
their utmost to bold their government back from provoking to
or engaging in hostilities. But this, we submit, is a very feeble
motive. Comn1erce and trade are always opposed to war, but
have little to do with causing or preventing it. The vindication
of national honor, accident, passion, the lust of conquest, revenge
for supposed affront, are the causes of war, and the c01pmercial
interests which would be put in jeopardy by it have seldom, if
ever, been persuasive to prevent it.
And as to its continuance or termination, commerce really bas
nothing to do with it. When the military and financial strength
of one side is exhausted the war, according to modern methods,
must come to an end, and the noncombatant merchants a nd
traders have no more to do with bringing about the consu1nmation
than the clergymen and schoolmasters of a nation.
Once more, it is said that the bloodless capture of merchant
ships and their cargoes is the most humane and barn1less enlployment of military force that can be exercised, and that in view
of the community of interest in comn1erce to which we have
referred and the practice of insurance in distributing the loss, the
effect of such captures upon the general sentiment and feeling of
the nation to \Vhich they belong is 1nost effective as a means of
persuading their government to make peace.
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But we reply that bloodless though it be H is still the extreme
of oppression and injustice practiced upon unoffencling and innocent indiYiduals, and that it has no nppreciable effect in reaching
or compelling the action of the GoYernment of 'Yhich the sufferers
are subjects.
We appeal, then, to our fellow delegates assembled here from
all nations in the interest of peace, for the prevention of war, and
the mitigation of its evils to take this important subject into serious consideration, to study the arguments that will be presented
for and against this proposition, which has already enlisted the
sympathy and support of the people of mnny nations, to be
guided not wholly by the individual interest of the nations that
they represent, but to determine what shall be f01· the best interest of all the nations in general and whether commerce, which is
the nurse of peace and international amity, ought not to be preserved and protected, although it nuly require from a few nations
the concession of the remnnnt of an ancient right, the chief value
of which has long since been extinguished.
In the consideration of such a question, the interest of neutrals,
who constitute at all times the great majority of the nations,
ought to be first considered, and if they will declare on this occasion their adhesion to the humane and beneficent proposition
which we have offered, we may rest assured that, although we
may fail of unanimous agreen1ent, such an expression of opinion
will represent the general judgment of the world and will tend
to dissuade those of us who may become belligerents fron1 any
further exercise of this right, which is so abhorrent to every principle of justice and fair play. (Ibid., p. 778-779.)

Replies to the American proposition, 1907.-The reception of Mr. Choate's address ·was most cordial, though not
all the delegations were able to accept its conclusions.
Some offered reasons of policy, others offered reasoned
arguments. While political reasons were not supposed to
influence the deliberations, it is evident that national conditions could not be disregarded.
A Colombian delegate concluded a considerable discussion of Mr. Choate's address with the following words:
Pour en finir, ~Iessieurs, nous n'acceptons pas la proposition de
M. Choate parce que nos conditions et nos circonstances ne nous
pern1ettent pas ce beau luxe en fa Yeur des principes abstraits de
la justice et de l'hu1nanite. On l)eut etre apotre et chercher le
martyre individuellement; quand on represente un pays, on a le
devoir de defendre ses interets; dans le cas present,_ il s'agit de
politique internationale et non pas de philanthropie. (DenxH~1ne
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 792.)

1~1

l\1. Renault, of the l~rench delegation, maintained that

the analogy bebYeen 'var on land and on sea 'vas not coin~
plete, that the disturbance of the econo1nic life of the
con1n1unity by capture of 1nerchant ships " 'as a means of
coercion 'v hich might prevent 'var or hast en peace, and
one could not say it 'vas in a high degree inhumane. As
the ships n1ay easily be conyerted into 'var vessels, they
may constitute a potential 1neans of defense the loss of
'vhich would hasten the close of hostilities. M. Renault
was opposed to the ancient idea of prize money. He
closes his address as follo·ws:
D'autre part, c'est clans }'interet general de l'Etat en meme
t~mps que dans le leur que 1es arrnateurs et chargeurs des
rwYires captures ont continue leurs operations rnalgre la guerre.
Il ne serait done pas juste qu'ils subissent seuls les consequences
de la capture. Aussi l'idee que l'Etat, dan son ensemble, doit subir
les consequences prejudiciables de la guerre non seulement en tant
qu'elles se sont produites directernent contre l'Etat lui-meme et
ses etablissements, rnais encore en tant qu'elles ont atteint les
particuliers, s'affirme de plus en plus; on peut differer sur les
moyens de la realiser, mais i1 n'y a guere de doute sur le principe
lui-meme.
Si ces considerations sont, connne nou~ le croyons, justes, le
droit de capture apparait comrne nne mesure dirigee par un Etat
belligerant contre un autre Etat belligerant, cette mesure faisant
partie de !'ensemble des operations par lesquelles un Etat s'efforce
de reduire son adversaire a composition et n'ayant par elle-menle
aucun caractere particulier de rigueur. Il n'y a done pas, suivant
nous, de raison suffisante pour y renoncer, tant que l'entente necessaire a laquelle nous ayons fait allusion au debut eta la formati on
de laquelle nons sommes prets a concourir, ne se sera pas realisee.
(Ibid., p. 794.)

Sir Edward Fry, of the English delegation, said:
J e demande la parole seulement sur un sujet de nos deb a ts. Le
americain que nous venons d'entendre ayec tant d'interet
a beaucoup parle de la cruaute de l'exercice du droit de capturer
la propriete privee. A rnon avis c'est un rnal-entendu. Il est
vrai que dans toutes les or)erations de la guerre, il y a quelque
chose de barbare, rnais de toutes les operations il n'y en a pas
une qui soit aussi humaine que l'exercice de ce droit. Considerez,
je vous prie, ces deux cas: l'un, Ia capture d'un yaisseau marchand
sur mer; l'autre, les operations d'une armC>e ennemie. Dans le
premier cas . .;,ous yoyez une force majeure contre laquelle il est
impossible de combattre; personne n'est tue, rneme personne n'est
DeH~gue
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blesse; c'est nne affaire pacifique. De l'autre cote, qu'est-ce
que vous voyez? Vous voyez le terrain desole, le betail detruit,
les maisons brulees, les femmes et les enfants fuyant devant les
soldats ennemis et Jleut-etre des horreurs sur lesquelles je voudrais garder le silence. Se plaindre done de la capture des vaissea ux marcllands sur mer, et ne pas interdire la guerre sur terre,
c'est choisir le plus grand des deux n1aux. (Ibid., p. 800.)

rrhe delegate fron1 the Argentine Republic took a similar position. (Ibid, p. 810.)
Position of }letherlands, 1907.--The Nether lands position in the Second Hague Conference was that it shared
fully the sentiments and adhered to the principles of
inviolability of private property as set forth by the
A1nerican delegation:
La delegation des Pays-Bas est favorable a toute proposition
etablissnnt le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee sue
mer.
Afin que la possilJilite de transformer en temps de guerre des
n avires de commerce en croiseurs auxilinres ne puisse etre un
motif pour ne pas accepter ce principe, la delegation soumet aux
eonsiclern ti: ns de la Commission la proposition suivante:
Ancnn nnvire marclland ne pent etre capture par une partie .
belligerante pour Je seul fait de naviguer sous pavilion ennemi
s' il est muni cl'un passeport delivre par l'autorite competente de
son pays, dans lequel passeport il est declare que le navire ne
sera pa s transforme en va isseau de guerre ni utilise comme tel
vendant toute la duree de la guerre. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, 'l'ome III, p. 1142.)

B razil.- The Brazilian delegation 'vas favorable to assiinilating the status of private property at sea to the
status of private property on land. He refers in his
proposition to the articles of The Hague convention relative to the la,vs and customs of war on land:
B. Lor sque Je capitaine d'un navire ou d'une flotte belligerante se
t rouvera dans la necessite de requisitionner, dans le cas prevu
a l'article 23, lettre g, de la susmentionne c~mvention, c'est-adire dans Je cas ou 1a destruction ou la saisie de ces biens lui
sont commandees par les exigences les plus in1perieuses de la
guerre , un vaissen u de commerce ennemi, sa cnrgaison, ou nne
portion quelconque de celle-ci, la requisition sera constatee par
celui qui Ja fait moyennant des re~us delivres au .capitaine du
vaisseau qn 'on aura snisi, ou dont on aura saisi les marchandises,
a vec tons les details possibles pour assurer nux parties interessfes leur d roit a une jtlste indeminite.
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C. Cette clause s'apvlique nux warchmHli:.;cs lH'utres, qui sc
trouYeron t :1 n bord des Yaissea ux ma rchands ennemis requisitiones.
Le cnpitane du IUlYire ou <lela flotte de guerre, qui aura determine In requisition, est tenu <le fa ire mettre a terre, dans Ull des
ports les pins proches, les officiers et !'equipage dn ba timent sn isi,
:tYee Ies ressources necessaireR 11otn· leur retour au vays n uquel H
a ppa rtena it.
Denn~a;·lc.-Deninark

"Was in favor of exen1ption if it
conld be by co1nmon agree1nent.
B elgiu1n.-The Belgian delegate subn1itted a set of
rules "Which had in vie"w that private vess.els of the ene1ny
could be seized and retained by a belligerent, bnt 'vere to
be restored at the close of hostilities. The crews of such
vessels ·were to be liberated on condition that they would
take no part in the war.
France.-The French delegation, ad1nitting that 'var
'vas not for the profit of individuals and that the loss
should not be borne by individuals, sho,ved a disposition
to accept the American proposition in case of unani1nity.
The delegation 1nade a reasoned proposition:
Considerant que, si le droit des gens positif admet encore la
legitime du droit de capture applique a la propriete privee ennemie
sur mer, il est eminemn1ent desirable que, jusqu'a ce que l'entente
puisse s'etablir entre les Etats au sujet de sa suppression, l'exercice en soit subordonne a certaines modalites.
Considerant qu'il import an plus haut point que, conformement
a Ia conception moderne de 1a guerre qui doit etre dirigee contre
Ies Eta ts et non contre Ies particuliers, Ie droit de prise ap11araisse
nniquement comme un moyen de coercition pratique par un Etat
contre un autre etat;
Que, dans cet or_der d'idees, tout benefice particulier au profit
des agents de l'I~ta t qui exercent Ie droit de prise devrait etre
exclu et que les pertes subies par les }mrticnliers de chef des prises
deYraient finnlement incomber a l'Etat dont ils reieYent.
La Deiegn tion fran~aise n l'honneur de proposer a la Qua trH~me
Commission d'emettre le vreu que les etats qui exerceront le
droit de capture suppriment les part de IH'ises a ttribnees a nx
equipages des batiments capteurs et prennent 1es mesures necessaires pour que les pertes ca usees pnr l'exercice dn droit de prise
ne restent pas entieren1ent a la charge des varticuliers dont Ies
hiens auront ete cnptures. (Ibid., p. 1148.)
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.ll ustria-Hungary.- The 1\nstro-llnngarian delegation
proposed amendments to the :B..,rench fonn:
Animee du vif desir de Yoir terminer la discussion de la Quat rieme Commission sur l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee
ennemie sur mer par une amelioration, si legere fftt-elle, de l'etat
actuel, et estimant que le vreu propose par la Delegation fran~aise
renferme des elements propres a arriver a. ces finR, mais tennant
compte toutefois de certaines objections que ce vreu lui semble
a voir rencontre de la part d'un nombre considerable des membres
cle cette Commission, la Delegation d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'honneur de proposer les" arnendements suiyants dans le texte emis
par la Delegation de France:
(a) mettre a pres " que les " au lieu de "Etats qui exerceront
le droit de capture " les mots : " Puissances qui maintiennent Ia
faculte de faire des prises " ;
(b) a la place de " prennent les mesures necessaires" in serer
les m ots: " s'occupent a chercher un moyen praticable"; et
( c) a u lien de " du droit de prises " mettre "de cette faculte.''

R esu1ne of The Hague propositions, 1907.-The president of the commission having the subject of the in1Inunity of private property at sea under consideration
at The Hague in 1907 ·was 1\IL de Martens, a ?killed and
experienced Russian diplomat. He endeavored to give
a resu1ne of the various propositions and arguments advanced before the commission. At the 1neeting of July
·17, 1907, he spoke to the follo ·w ing effect:
La provosi tion an1ericaine a suscite bea ucoup d'a utres propositions ; la question a ete posee en 1899, elle a ete alors etudiee
pnr la Premiere Conference sous benefice cl'in ventaire; huif annees
-sc sont passees depuis. on a done eu le temps de se vreparer sur
la question qui semble aujourd'hui epuisee. II est inconte~table,
a raison des propositions intermediaires qui ont ete deposees. que
l'applicn tion clu principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee
sur mer ne reunit pas l'nnanimite des suffrages; ce n'est pas a
la Commission qu'il appartient de cliscuter les motifs qui peuvent
fa ire vnloir les differents Gouvernements, mais il n'en est pas
moins vrai qui sur cette question on rencontre des hesitations, des
scruples et meme des craintes. Les Etats ont evidemment !'appreh ension d'npporter une solution dont 1es consequences leur sont
inconnnes ; d'entrer dans les tenebres. De nombreux auteurs ont
ecrit sur le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete sur mer;
il s sont loin d'etre d'accord entre eux, meme · s'ils appartienn en t an meme vays. Le President rapel1e qu'on a cite l'ouvrage
qn'i1 a (•crit i1 y a qunrnnte ans; i1 etait alors le partis~n1 con-
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de l'inYiolabilite, mais uepui~ cette longue epoque i1 est
deYenu plus circonspect sur cette question delicate.
Les faits historiques qui viennent a l'appui de la these americnine, snggerent quelques observations. Le traite que la Prusse
signa aYec les Etats-Unis on 1785 a consacre le priricipe rle l'inviolabilite, mais il faut se rapeller que ce traite fut signe par un
Hoi philosophe et un Prince parmi les philosophes, qui du reste
n~avaient guere d'illusions sur la portee pratique de leur accord,
car ils sa vaient to us les deux qu'une guerre entre leurs deux
pqys n'etait guere probable. On a encore cite une depeche qui
fut addressee en 1824 a l\1. M:ittleton, ministre des Etats-Unis a
·Petersbourg et dans laquelle le Comte Nesselrode exprimait toutc~
sa sympathie pour le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete
prives sur mer.
l\1ais il faut prendre aussi en consideration la depeche, datant
de la meme epoque, ou le Comte Nesselrocle, ecrivant au Comte
Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadenr de Russie a Paris, exclut l'eventualite d'un engagement ferme dans nne question grosse de consequences qu'on ne pourrait pas aisen1ent calculer. En 1856, le
Prince Gortchakoff a egalement exprime son energique sympathie
pour !'abolition de la capture, mais, lui anssi, a entrevu les
difficultes qu'elle suscitait.
Depuis 1785 jusqu'a aujourd'hui, le principe que discute la Commission n'a ete mis qu'une fois en application, pendant la guerre
entre la Prusse, l'Italie et l' A utriche en 1866. Ces Puissances
ont declare au moncle qn'il n'y aurait pas de capture des navires
de commerce. mais cette guerre a ete d'une si courte duree
qu'elle ne peut etre citee comme un precedent. L'argument le plus
concluant que l'on a mis en avant a ete la difference du regime
qui pendant la guerre regit la propriete sur terre et la propriete
sur n1er, mais cet argument repose sur un malentendu. La Conference de 1899 a fonde, pour ainsi dire, nne societe d'assnrances
mutuelles contre les abus de la force pendant la guerre sur terre;
neanmoins si on les compare avec ceux de la guerre sur mer. ils
sont bien plus terribles. Que le territoire soit on ne soit pas
occupe par l'ennemi, quoique le pillage soit aujourd'hui interdit,
les necessites n1ilitaires que reconnaissent les articles 47, 48, etc.,
de la Convention de 1899, pesent d'un poids tres lourd sur le
paysan comme sur le proprietaire, eHes les infligent non seulement des souffrances morales mais des souffrances materielles
que les conT"entions ne peuyent pas supprimer au moment ou la
force prime le droit meme. Si l'on n'admet pas le principe de
l'inviolabilite de la proprH~te priYee sur mer, les particuliers ont
de nombreux moyens pour echapper aux consequences de la
guerre; ils peuyent notamment vendre leurs nayires et les reconstruire a la fin des hostilites. Leur situation deyiendra bien plus
favorable si l'on supprime le droit de capture; elle sera meme
YllhlCU
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vrivilegiee, vnh.;que leurs affaires augmenteront et se feront au
detriment <.les entreprises continentales paralysees par l'invasion.
O'est a la Commission cl'examiner sons tous ses cotes la decision
qu'ele va prendre en se conformant aux instructions que le~
Delegues ont re~ues de leurs Gouvernernents.
Le Presillent termin0 ainsi son discours:
Tel est, :Messieurs, l'expose impartial de toute la question sur
laquelle vous allez vous prononcer. En vous presentant cet
€·xpose des faits historiques et cles considerations docurnentees,
je n'avais nulle1nent !'intention ni d'influencer votre vote, ni de
me prononcer personnellement contre la prise en cosicleration cle
la proposition (Annexe 10) de ln Delegation des Etats-Unis
<.!_'Amerique. Je ne veux uullement IH'enclre rmrti ui pour ni
contre la proposition arnericaine. J.\Ion devoir de President de
cette Commission 1n'imposa d'eclaircir ~le terrain sur lequel 11ou~
nons trouvons et de contribuer de mes fnibles forces a une comr< ete orientation sur to us les rn·incipa ux faits et arguments tleveloppes clevant vous sur cette tres interessante et tres compliquee nwtiere. (Ibid., p. 833-834.)

Vote at The l-1 ague, 190'7.·-The vote taken at The
Hague in 1907 upon the question of inviolability of private property at sea sho,vs in a Ineasure the modern attitude upon the subject. The subject 'vas very fully discussed, the delegates were authorized by their Govern-·
Inents, and the n1atter had been included in the program of the Conference. Of 33 States voting, 21 States
voted for the inviolability, 11 against, and 1 abstained
fron1 voting.
Those voting for 'vere Gern1any (under reservations),
United States, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China,
Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Nor,vay,
Netherlands, Persia, Roumania, Sia1n, s,veden, S·witzerland, and Turkey.
T'hose voting against ·were Colombia, Spain, France,
Great Britain, Japan, Mexico, Montenegro, Panan1a,
Portugal, Russia, and Salvador.
Chile abstained fro1n voting. (ibid., p. 834.)
M. de Martens remarked that the vote ·was hardly decisive, considering the maritime predominance of son1e
of the po,vers voting in the negative.
Upon the Brazilian proposition elabornting the assiinilation of the treatment of priYate property at sea
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to the treabnent of private property on land 13 Yotes
were in favor and 12 opposed.
The Belgian proposition, an1ended by the Netherlands,
looking to the mitigation and definition of 'varfare on
sea, was taken up by a vote of 23 in favor , 3 against
(Great Britain, Japan, and Russia), and 2 abstentions.
This \vas subsequently "'ithclra w. n fron1 consideration.
The consideration of the French proposition led to no
decisive action.
Conclusion as to The Ii ague discttssion, 1907.-At The
Hague in 1907 there 'vas undoubtedly a n1uch 'vider difference of opinion than 1nany had anticipated in regard
to inviolability of private property at sea.
This difference is shown in the report of M. Fromageot
upon the subject. This report concludes:
Si le maintien de l'etat de choses a ctuel parait devoir resulter
de ceete deliberation, il est permis de penser, comme l'a dit
!'eminent Premier Delegue de Belgique, S. Exc. l\L Beernaert,
qu'une entente future n'a rien impossible. (Deuxierne Conference
Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 249.)

Thus it n1ay be concluded that the po·wers of the world
'vere not prepared in 1907 to accept the princi pie of inviolability of private property at sea.
The Brazilian proposition received some support,
however, by en1bodi1nent a1nong the w·i~hes of the conference of the sta te1nent of the wish " that in any case
the powers n1ay apply, as far as possible, to war by sea
the principles of the convention relative to the laws and
customs of war on land."
From the attitude of the powers in 1907 it is evident
that agreen1ent upon the subject of inviolability of private property at sea 'viii not be reached till other 1natters
relating to 1naritime warfare are settled.
Enemy ships.-If all private property at sea except
that of the nature of contraband is to be inviolable, there
will be a tendency to extend the list of contraband
articles.
It is presumed that the laws governing liability in regard to blockade and unneutral service will still be operative.
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If~ however~

conversion of ene1ny private ships into
ships of war is to be permitted on the high sea, it will be
necessary for a belligerent to use great care in his conduct
to\vard his opponent's private vessels. _.._1\. private v~ssel
of one belligerent which may be met on the high sea by
the other belligerent may claim exen1ption on the ground
that it is a private vess·21, ·which may be the fact at the
time. Shortly afterwards the private vessel may be converted into a public war vessel. It is now not only ·liable
to capture, but also liable to be destroyed or seized, and
its personnel may be made prisoners of war. As there
are as yet no rules regulating reconversion, such a vessel
may after a time, P·2rha ps \\hen capture may be expected,
undergo reconversion into a private vessel and be accordingly exen1pt as private property.
To include Yessels without exception in the exemption
making private property at sea inviolable is to give an
exemption after war is opened and vessels have sailed
'vith a knowledge thereof, which is not given to vessels
in a belligerent port at the outbreak of war or to vessels
\vhich have sailed without knowledge of the war bound
for a belligerent port. _.._1\.rticle V of the convention relative to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak
of hostilities provides thatThe present conYention does not affect merchant ships whose
build shows that they are intended for conYersion into war ships.

At the present time few ships are of such construction
that they 1nay not, under some circumstances, be of use
for war even if not originally constructed for that service. _
-'-t\. pleasure yacht may becon1e useful as a scouting vessel,
an ordinary privately O\\ned collier 1nay easily be con-·
verted into a public collier, etc.
It would seen1 necessary that if other innocent private
property is granted exe1nption, it \Yould be on the ground
that the innocence can be determined fron1 the nature of
the property itself.
Goods of the nature of contraband can be determined
in most cases from inspection. \Vhether a vessel is to be
~onverted from private to public can not be determined
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by inspection. for the physical character (•I the Ye5sel
may remain the same in priYate or in public con trol. The
control is the main difference~ and this may be transferred
by radiotelegraph or eYen on a certain date b_y preYious
agreement! vd1ich date may not haYe arriYecl at the time
when the Yessel was met by the belligerent of the other
fla g.
P rof. 1r estlake~s opinion.- The late Prof. \\~estlake: of
Cambridge: in a note to L atifFs~~ Effects of W ar on P roperty~~! speaks of the cornrnercia l blockad~ as a war against
neut rals.
But if only sentiment can be gratified by limiting the war
against the enemy· s commercial flag, the war against neutrals is
to continue, with the certainty that commercial blockades. when
they haYe become t he sole means of paralyzing the enemy's sea
tr ade, will be pr acti cally carlied as f ar as audacity can 'entur e
to st rain or t o \ iola te rules.
The name in which this t opsy-tur\y po1icy i s ad,oca ted is that
of immunity at sea of pri\ate enemy proper ty a s such, and this
is asserted to be the ext ension to the sea of a principle admitted
on la nd. I n truth , h owe\er! the immunity· of prt vate enemy
property is not a dmitted anywhere a s a bsolute. It is only admitted so far as it does not interfere with an y operations deem ed
t o be useful f or putting pressure on the enemy or f or defense
against him. (La tifi. Effects of War on P rol)€rty, p. 141.)

. .~fter
.
a considerable discussion Pro£. \festlake says :
Lastly, if it ca n n ot be maint ained, either l egally or a s a question of political f act , th a t individual subjects or citizen s a re foreign to the wa r s of t h eir Sta te, there remains the pl ea urged on
the ground of h umanity-that they ought to be exempted as f a r
as possible from the consequences of their solidarity. But they
have to bear those consequences in l and war, and in na,al war
the risk and loss are far more easily met and spread over the
community by insurance and by the increa sed price of the cargoes
which escape the risk.

The conclusion is :
(1) That there is no principle, consistent with the existence
and nature of war, on which a belligerent can be required to a bstain from trying to suppress his enemy's commerce under his
flag.
(2) That between trying by commercial blockades to suppress
the enemy's commerce under the neutral flag and allowing it to
pass free under his O"\"\"'ll flag there is a glaring inconsistency.
19148-14--9
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( 3 ) And t hat th e subject is therefore open to be dealt with on
the ground of th e probable effects of a ny chan ge in the law.
( Ibid, p. 151. )

Resum.e.-The wide consideration that has been given
to the subject o£ immunity o£ private enemy property at
sea shows that there are differences o£ opinion among
different states and even within single states. These differences are supported by arguments which are worthy
o£ careful consideration. It is not proved to the satisfaction o£ n1any that the exe1nption of private enemy property will shorten or even make war more humane. Some
· maintain with strong arguments that the reverse would
be the result. It is certain that not all private enemy
property could consistently with the ends o£ war be
exempt from capture. It is probable that -in some wars
the list o£ free goods could be extended more than in other ·
wars.
The. United States has uniformly striven for the principle o£ exemption o£ private property at sea in time of
war. The other states of the world have not been willing
to adopt this principle. The United States has therefore been obliged to shape its policy in recent years accordingly and to accept the fact that other nations were
not prepared to agree to exemption of private property
at sea.
There are many who maintain that in war, under present conditions o£ fleets, the capture of private property
could not be resorted to as a means o£ injuring the enemy,
as it would be more to the disadvantage o£ the captor
than to the belligerent :from whom capture is made.
It is certain that the capture of private enemy property
at sea as an object o£ war has become of much less importance than formerly, and the United States may regard the question as much less vital than before the
twentieth century. Certain private property at sea could
certainly be seized under restrictions similar to those
governing seizure on land even i£ the doctrine o£ inviolability was approved. This, in £act, would result in
treatment which would be about all that could be demanded i£ war upon the sea is to exist. There would
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therefore arise, in case of the adoption o:f the principle
o:f inviolability, a doctrine in regard to exception o:f certain classes of property :from the inviolability. On the
other hand, the same result is gradually being brought
about by the· agreement not to inter:fere with or not to
capture certain classes o:f vessels or property in time of
war on the sea. Perhaps the gradual enlargement o:f the
list o:f exen1ptions may be niore easy to obtain and more
in accord with rational procedure than a sweeping prohibition which would be accompanied with a large list o:f
exceptions o:f classes o:f property which would be liable
to capture. The United States can consistently indorse
either method of harmonizing maritime warfare with the
principles o:f humanity, :for one method o:f procedure
may reach the goal sought as quickly as the other, and
the gradual development o:f a list o:f property :free :from
capture may be practicable with the minimum o:f friction
and difficulty.
Oonclusion.-The United States may with propriety
abandon the contention :for the general exemption of
enemy private property at sea and seek agreement upon
a certain list o:f exemptions which meet the approval of
the states o:f the world and which may from time to time
be expended as t4e sentiment :for exemption becomes more
general.

